INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, there has been increasing attention for various kinds of asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism. Is the impact of monetary policy asymmetric over the business cycle? Does a monetary contraction have a stronger impact than a monetary expansion?
Is the transmission of large interest rate changes different from that of small steps? Obviously, these issues are important to take into account in the formulation of monetary policy. In this paper, we investigate asymmetries in the credit demand equation. We do this by giving an overview of previous studies as well as presenting new results based on Dutch data. In line with most empirical work in this field (e.g. Fase, 1995; Kakes, 2000) we focus on the demand side of the credit market. This choice can be further motivated by empirical evidence that, at least in the short run, the Dutch credit market is demand determined (see e.g. Kakes, 2000) and can be characterised as a customer market (Swank, 1994) .
Prior to the start of EMU, the Dutch credit market was a relevant factor for monetary policy, despite the fact that monetary autonomy was significantly reduced because of the fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the Dmark and the high degree of capital mobility. Due to the imperfect integration of the credit market with international capital markets there was even scope for a domestic money supply target (see Kuipers and Sterken, 1995) , which was actually pursued in some way or another until 1991. Is it still interesting to focus on the Dutch credit market after the start of EMU? After all, monetary policy is first and foremost based on euro-wide aggregated data now.
However, credit markets of individual member states are still likely to exhibit specific national characteristics (see e.g. De Bondt, 2000) . Hence, as cross-national differences in monetary transmission may complicate the implementation of a common monetary policy, it is still useful to consider individual EMU economies. Furthermore, credit growth is also interesting from a financial stability point of view, which has clearly a national dimension.
We investigate two sources of non-linearity in the credit demand equation: monetary policy asymmetry and business cycle asymmetry. Our results show that in periods of expansionary monetary policy, interest rate changes have more impact on aggregate credit than during monetary contractions. This result corroborates the findings of Van Ees et al. (1999) and Kakes (2000) . Rather than making an a priori distinction between positive and negative monetary policy shocks, as these two studies do, we employ a threshold regression model and explicitly test whether nonlinearities are present. Interestingly, our conclusion is different from the standard 'credit view' literature. In particular, studies emphasizing the importance of a 'financial accelerator' (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1994) imply an asymmetry in the opposite direction. In line with Kakes (2000) , we did not find evidence for business cycle asymmetry in the credit demand equation in the Netherlands.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of previous literature on asymmetric effects of monetary policy. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the methodology we applied, and in Section 4 we present our results. Section 5 concludes.
NONLINEARITIES IN THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Is the monetary transmission mechanism characterised by asymmetric effects? This rather old theme in monetary economics goes back to pre-war theories. An early example of monetary transmission being dependent on the state of the economy is the liquidity trap, first described by Keynes (1936) and recently restated by Krugman (1998) . Another example is that the impact of monetary policy may be different over the business cycle. Credit market imperfections and downward price rigidities may cause monetary policy to have more of an impact in a recession than during a boom (see Walsh, 1998 or Kakes, 2000 , for a discussion of underlying theories).
Furthermore, interest rate changes themselves may have asymmetric effects. It is often stated that especially monetary contractions have a real impact, whereas monetary expansions are ineffective (like 'pushing on a string'). Hence, monetary policy cannot be used to stimulate the economy or, as it was formulated in the 1930s, 'one can lead a horse to the water but one cannot make him drink' (Edie, 1931) .
In recent years, many empirical studies have investigated whether these asymmetries can be observed in practice. Asymmetry over the business cycle has been established for the United
States by Thoma (1994), Gertler and , Kashyap et al. (1994) , Garcia and Schaller (1995) and Weise (1999) . Kakes (2000) finds asymmetric effects of monetary policy over the business cycle for the United States, Germany, the UK and Belgium, but not for the Netherlands.
Asymmetric effects on real activity between monetary contractions and expansions have been established by Cover (1992) for the United States and by Karras (1996a Karras ( , 1996b Garretsen and Swank, 1998a , 1998b , and Kakes, 2000 as well as micro-data (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Whited, 1992; Kashyap and Stein, 1999 and, for the Netherlands, Van Ees et al., 1998 Van Ees et al. (1999) and Kakes (2000) find that expansionary monetary policy measures have more of an impact on credit growth than monetary contractions in the Netherlands. Van Ees et al. analyse the instalment and withdrawal of direct credit constraints, a policy instrument that was used by the Dutch central bank until 1991, and conclude that only the latter had a significant effect. Kakes (2000) finds the same result for a group of European countries (including the Netherlands) but not for the United States, using several monetary policy indicators. After a description of our methodology, we provide new evidence in the spirit of these two studies in Section 4. An important extension of our approach is that we do not make an a priori distinction between monetary expansions and contractions. Rather, we employ a threshold model in which the border between the expansionary and contractionary regime does not necessarily coincide with a distinction between interest rate increases and interest rate decreases, but may also be at a point slightly different from zero (e.g. increases higher than x% versus decreases and increases below x%).
THRESHOLD REGRESSION MODELS
Threshold regression models are a popular vehicle in non-linear modelling. They can be applied in models with multiple equilibria, or in situations where the sample must be split on the basis of a (continuously-distributed) variable. Recently, Bruce Hansen developed the statistical theory of threshold models further and made it accessible to a more general audience in a series of articles (Hansen, 1997 (Hansen, , 1999a (Hansen, , 1999b (Hansen, and 2000 . The exposition of threshold regression models in this section draws heavily on the Hansen papers.
Suppose we have n observations of the endogenous variable y t , the m-vector of predetermined variables x t and the threshold variable q t . A threshold regression (TR) model takes the following form:
where e t is the regression error. The threshold variable q t splits the sample in two regimes: the parameters may differ depending on the regime, which are determined by the threshold value ?.
The threshold regression model of Equations (1a)-(1b) can be expressed in a single equation
( 2) where I(.) denotes the indicator function, which has the value one if the argument is true and zero if the argument is false. Defining
where 
The LS estimate of ? is the value that minimises the sum of squared errors of Equation (6) ( ) Hansen (1996) shows that this bootstrap analogue produces asymptotically correct p-values.
Confidence intervals
Valid confidence intervals for the threshold parameter can be based on the likelihood ratio (or F)
which tests the null hypotheses γ γ: 
RESULTS
We construct a threshold regression equation for credit in the Netherlands, which we interpret as representing the demand side of the credit market. This is consistent with the signs we find for the interest rate coefficients (insofar as these are significant), but also with studies that conclude that the credit market is -at least in the short run -demand determined (Kakes, 2000) and shows the characteristics of a customer market (Swank, 1994) . We use quarterly observations from the first quarter of 1983 up to and including the final quarter of 1997. This is a homogeneous period for monetary policy, given the fact that the Dutch guilder was pegged to the Dmark at a constant parity. Furthermore, it is important to note that we do not include the late 1990s, which has been a period of very high credit growth in combination with decreasing interest rates. Hence, our results cannot be attributed to this specific period. Typically, credit demand (CR) depends on output (GDP), a long-term interest rate (r l ) and a short-term interest rate (r s ). 
where the endogenous variable is credit and the set of regressors consists of a constant, lags of credit, (lags of) output and (lags of) the interest rate(s). Because we allow all parameters in the credit demand equation to be regime-dependent, while we believe it is unrealistic to assume that credit can be explained by either output or interest rates alone, the number of parameters to be estimated is large. As a consequence, we cannot include many lags. To keep the analysis tractable in terms of degrees of freedom, we set the maximum lag of the right-hand-side variables at two quarters.
We consider two threshold variables: (i) changes in the short-term interest rate, which can be interpreted as monetary policy, and (ii) business cycle changes. For these threshold variables we investigated several specifications distinguishing: (i) nominal or real credit and GDP; (ii) variables in levels, first differences and annual differences; and (iii) the threshold variable in first differences or in annual differences. The threshold variable was allowed to have a lag between 0 and 6 periods. For all specifications we carried out the linearity test described in Section 3, using 1000 replications to compute the bootstrap-calculated p-values. In the computations the top and bottom 25% of the sample of observations on the threshold variable were trimmed. There was no evidence of residual heteroskedasticity in any of the models we estimated, so we did not make a correction for this.
For all specifications where linearity is rejected, we computed the estimates of the parameters of the linear model and the threshold value and the parameters in both regimes. A general observation is that interest rates are hardly significant in the linear versions of the credit demand equation, in which credit is typically explained by the constant term, lagged credit and economic activity. Previous studies on the Dutch credit market have also found very low or insignificant interest rate elasticities, particularly for short-term credit (see Fase, 1990 , for an overview).
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However, interest rates enter the scene when we split the sample and estimate a threshold regression. Figure 1 . Looking at the results for the two regimes, both interest coefficients are significant in regime 1 (annual interest short-term rate changes below the threshold value of -0.30%) and substantially higher in absolute terms than in the linear equation. By contrast, interest rates are insignificant in regime 2 (interest changes higher than -0.30%). Hence, the impact of both short-term and long-term interest rate changes on credit is substantial in a regime of declining short-term interest rates, whereas it is insignificant in a regime of only modestly declining or increasing short-term rates. This is confirmed by Figure 2 , in which the impact of 1%-point increases in the short-term and the long-term interest rates is simulated over ten quarters, using the estimated threshold regressions of both regimes in Table 2 . 7 Presented are both the effect of a one-period increase, denoted as a 'temporary shock', and a permanent increase of the interest rates, denoted as a 'permanent shock'. Since these simulations also take into account the lag structure of the other variables, they give a more complete picture of the impact of interest rate changes than just the estimated interest rate coefficients.
Figure 2a
Simulated impact short-term interest rate shock on credit
Figure 2b
Simulated impact long-term interest rate shock on credit Our result corroborates the conclusion of Van Ees et al. (1999) and Kakes (2000) , that monetary policy has more impact on credit aggregates if monetary conditions are expansionary. This is also in line with the experience in the past few years, when credit growth increased markedly while 7 Note that in all cases we simulate interest rate increases. Given the fact that the individual equations of each regime are linear, the effect of an interest rate decrease mirrors the simulation results that are How can this asymmetry be explained? Our findings are inconsistent with the standard credit view literature which implies the existence of asymmetric effects in the other direction, namely that a monetary contraction has more impact on credit than a monetary expansion. However, an explanation based on credit market imperfections along the lines of Asea and Blomberg (1998) may be useful to explain our results, by taking into account heterogeneity among borrowers.
Following a monetary contraction, there may be a shift from lending to low-quality borrowers towards high-quality borrowers: the first are rationed, while the latter try to create a buffer of external funds, possibly anticipating a further contraction. At the aggregate level, these two effects may cancel out, which implies that total credit is not significantly affected by a monetary tightening. By contrast, following a monetary expansion loans are given more easily to both lowquality and high-quality borrowers (in the terminology of Asea and Blomberg, 'good projects draw in bad projects'), so in this case there will be a significant impact on aggregate credit.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to test whether this explanation is relevant for the Netherlands, as disaggregated time series for several types of borrowers are not available.
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Another possible explanation for the observed asymmetry is that the Dutch credit market may be regarded as a 'customer market', rather than an auction market (Okun, 1981) . An important characteristic of customer markets is that banks attach value to long-term client relationships, which implies that they shield their loans portfolio after a monetary contraction. An interview study among banks by Swank (1994) provides empirical support for the concept of a customer market in the Netherlands.
Detailed analysis of the regression outcomes with the business cycle as threshold variable showed that here the evidence of threshold effects is weak. In most of the cases the, grid search produced presented here. In addition, it should be noted that each simulation is based on only one equation, and thus does not take into account the possibility of regime switches during the simulation period. 8 For example, the Dutch central bank's macroeconometric model MORKMON can only explain 60% of the increase in bank lending to the corporate sector in 1998 (see De Nederlandsche Bank, 1999) . 9 The only distinction that can be made is between households and firms (see e.g. Garretsen and Swank, 1998b; Kakes, 2000) . However, the interpretation of this distinction is not straightforward. On the one hand, the information asymmetry is larger for household credit than for corporate credit. Firms are generally better screened, particularly regarding expected cash flows. On the other hand, the bulk of loans to households consist of mortgages, which significantly reduces their risk. This would imply that households are for that part to be considered the 'high quality' borrowers. corner solutions, which implies that the number of observations in one regime becomes so low that unrealistic parameter estimates are obtained. Figure 3 illustrates that this is a corner solution. Hence, we cannot conclude that there are asymmetries over the business cycle. This corresponds to the conclusion of Kakes (2000) who finds that business cycle asymmetry can be established for the United States, Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom, but not for the Netherlands, using a Markov switching model to separate recessions and expansions. 
Figure 3
Confidence interval for threshold variable ? gdp t-5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we investigated whether a non-linear relationship between credit, output and interest rates in the Netherlands can be established for the 1983-1997 period. We found evidence of asymmetric effects of monetary policy on aggregate credit: if the monetary stance is expansionary, the impact of interest rate changes on credit is larger than in periods when the monetary stance is tightening. This finding is in line with previous studies based on different methodologies and different sample periods, and with the credit boom in the second half of the 1990s which coincided with decreasing interest rates. We could not establish asymmetry over the business cycle in the Netherlands for the 1983-1997 period. This finding is also consistent with previous research.
Two further remarks can be made. First, we have focused on the first stage of the monetary transmission process. We did not analyse the consequences for inflation or real activity.
Nevertheless, credit growth is generally considered an important information variable for monetary policy. Our results thus imply that non-linearity in credit demand should be taken into account for the assessment of the monetary policy stance. Perhaps this would explain the finding of Garretsen and Swank (1998a) , based on a linear model, that credit does not perform very well as a leading indicator for inflation and real activity in the Netherlands. Second, we did not explicitly investigate the underlying cause of the observed asymmetry. This would probably require an analysis with disaggregated data, in order to investigate the behaviour of different types of borrowers and lenders. The fact that our result differs from the standard 'credit view' is conclude that a bank lending channel is not important for the Netherlands.
In this paper we looked for asymmetries in credit demand in the Netherlands using a singleequation threshold regression model. The research can be extended in several directions. A next step may be to investigate asymmetries in credit demand using aggregated euro area data. In addition, other methods can be applied. Candidates are the smooth transition regression models advocated by Teräsvirta (1994 Teräsvirta ( , 1998 , which assume a gradual transition from one regime into the other, or a multivariate threshold regression model (Tsay, 1998; Choi, 1999; Chen and Shiang, 1999; Weise, 1999) .
